THE SMALLNESS OF SMALL STATES:  BETWEEN POWER AND VULNERABILITY by Stephanie, Happy Tracy
 1 
THE SMALLNESS OF SMALL STATES:  
BETWEEN POWER AND VULNERABILITY 
 
Happy Tracy Stephanie1 
 
Abstract 
This essay examines the power of small states in global development diplomacy. This 
essay seeks to address the following things. The power and obstacles of small states in 
global development diplomacy, how small states can increase their power, and the 
limitations of small state diplomacy. The most important part of this essay is the 
analysis related to the strategies to increase the power of small states. This essay 
argues that the sources of power of small states in global development diplomacy are 
the rise of non-traditional issues and their inherent resilience. Moreover, small states 
can use strategies of coalition building, issue prioritisation, and agenda setting to 
increase their power in global negotiations through intergovernmental organisations, 
focusing on the United Nations. 
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Introduction 
About two-thirds of the United Nations (UN) members are small states 
(https://www.diplomacy.edu/small-states-diplomacy). According to Diana Panke 
(2012, 316), a small state is a "state with less than average financial resources in a 
particular negotiation setting.” Just like their bigger counterparts, small states pursue 
the same interests of security, prosperity, and wellbeing of their citizens. They also 
conduct their diplomacy using the same diplomatic instruments as larger states. 
However, how small states conduct diplomacy attracts deep examinations because 
unlike bigger states, small states can experience some difficulties in conducting 
international negotiations due to limited budgets (Panke, 2012;317). 
In this essay, I shall argue that: First, the sources of power of small states in 
global development diplomacy are the rise of non-traditional issues and their inherent 
resilience. Second, small states can use three main strategies of coalition building, 
issue prioritisation, and agenda setting to increase their power in global negotiations 
through Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs), focusing on the UN. Due to the 
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broad issues in global development diplomacy, this essay mainly focuses on how 
small states diplomacy affect the issues of climate change and ocean. Every country in 
this world experiences the effects of climate change (Goal 13: Climate Action,” United 
Nations Development Programme, accessed October 20, 2018, 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-13-
climate-action.html.). Meanwhile, oceans which cover more than two-thirds of the 
earth's surface are crucial for global food security and human health (“Oceans and 
Seas,” Division for Sustainable Development Goals, accessed October 20, 2018, 
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/oceanandseas). Thus, the importance of 
climate change and oceans for sustainable development is widely recognised by the 
international community, including small states.   
This essay is divided into four sections. The first section examines the 
obstacles and power of small states in international negotiations. Second, the essay 
presents coalition building, issue prioritisation, and agenda-setting as strategies for 
small states to increase their power. The third section identifies the limitations of small 
state diplomacy. The conclusion as the last part synthesises all sections. 
 
Discussion 
Obstacles and Power of Small States 
Financial means is the main obstacle for small states in conducting international 
negotiations. According to Panke, due to financial obstacles, small states can 
experience three main difficulties: difficulty in developing good instructions, in 
actively participating in negotiation processes, and in the effectiveness of shaping 
strategies (Panke, 2012;317). First, because of fewer financial budgets, understaffed 
small state ministries are more inclined to be slower in developing and preparing 
national interests than ministries from bigger countries (Panke, 2012;316). Second, 
small states are more likely to have small numbers of delegations. The logic is that the 
fewer delegations in IGOs, the lower its activity rate.  This condition can lead to the 
higher the individual for each delegation and the less time to engage in networking 
with other states to draft bargaining demands, concessions, or compromises. Third, 
small states do not have enough capability to credibly threaten other states to 
cooperate through offering side payments. They also have more difficulties in 
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preparing compelling arguments due to fewer ministries and experts (Panke, 2012: 
316-317). However, this does not mean small states are weak states. They can take 
advantages of the rise of non-traditional issues and their inherent resilience as the 
sources of power. 
The rise of non-traditional issues gives power and opportunities for small states 
to pursue their interests in international negotiations. The high exposure of 
interdependencies due to non-traditional issues such as climate change, pandemic 
diseases, and other threats make it difficult for other states to ignore small states in 
deciding various international policies (Rienner, 2009: 6). Hence, as interdependence 
increases, more issues become an international agenda. Small states can use this as the 
source of power through IGOs. To illustrate, by establishing and advocating the 
sustainability of ocean as global issue in the UN, Pacific Island states were successful 
in securing the issue for Goal 14 under the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs).This was a significant political achievement, focusing Pacific Island states as 
global ocean guardians. The establishment of SDGs in general also illustrates the 
important roles of small states in achieving global goals (Quirck & Hanich, 2016;68). 
Second, inherent resilience is the source of small states’ power. According to 
DiploFoundation resilience that small states have to economic vulnerability can affect 
their bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, especially economic diplomacy. Resilience 
can be inherent or nurtured. It is the category of inherent resilience that is particularly 
relevant in small states context in this essay. Inherent resilience emerges “from 
positive factors of geography or resources over which a state has no direct control.” 
For example, Pacific Island countries waters are known as the world's largest tuna 
fishing ground (https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/sep/02/pacific-
islands-fail-to-agree-plan-to-protect-tuna).It also occupies half of the earth’s sea 
surface. These are natural factors of resilience that offset disadvantages of smallness.  
However, in the 21st century, the inherent resilience of small states can turn 
into threats. To illustrate, Pacific Island countries that constantly experience the rise of 
sea level as the impact of global warming. To overcome such threats and increase their 
power, small states can apply three strategies of coalition building, issue prioritisation, 
and agenda setting that will be unpacked on the next section. 
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Strategies to Increase the Power of Small States 
1. IGOs and Coalition Building  
Small states can establish coalitions in IGOs to increase their power. The basic 
question is why would states (big or small) be interested in IGOs such as the UN? The 
simple answer is that IGOs serve various functions such as coalition building that can 
help states to achieve their interests. Major IGOs such as the UN provide forums in 
which small states can engage with relatively low cost with representatives from many 
states, which can be expensive and difficult if it is done by bilateral engagements 
(Maley, 2018)). To illustrate, small states with limited budgets can spend less money 
by sending their delegations to the UN headquarters in which they can meet all 193 
representatives of UN member states. The UN and other IGOs provide arenas where 
states with the same or different interest can meet each other to discuss, argue, co-
operate, or disagree (Archer, 2001;73).  The UN is the only place where all member 
states have permanent representatives (ambassadors) throughout the year, so that when 
an issue emerges (related to national interests of states), formal or informal 
conversations can take place in a timely manner (Wiseman & Basu, 2013;326). 
As Christophe DuPont argues, there are two main functions of coalitions. First, 
coalitions function as a means for increasing or maximising bargaining power for its 
members (Dupont, 1996;76). Second, coalitions function as a means for managing the 
complexity of processes as well as issues within a regime where a common platform 
that incorporates the minimal demands of each member of the coalition is easier to 
handle and negotiate than the sum of individual items (Carter, 2015;207). These two 
core functions are important for small states with limited negotiation resources. 
Through IGOs, small states can establish coalitions concerning certain issues 
that can increase their bargaining leverage (Henrikson, 2018) and collective power, 
especially when it comes to the decision-making process such as voting (Karns & 
Mingst, 2013;147).  They also can engage in coalition building to constrain the 
behaviour of other states. IGOs also provide arenas for small states to seek new 
partners, maintain their coalitions with old partners, or to collaborate in pursuing 
collective interests. Small states can influence negotiation outcomes if they establish 
winning coalitions or blocking minorities. In fact, since the 1960s, group diplomacy 
through coalition building has been spread widely in many IGOs (Panke, 2012;321). 
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To illustrate, coalitions provides opportunities for Pacific Island countries as 
small states to leverage a pacific voice in the climate change negotiations. For decades, 
the global climate change regime has been an arena of complex diplomacy involving 
various actors and issues. The climate regime is built upon the 1992 United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which includes 196 states as parties to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (Carter, 2015;205-206). 
Overall, there are various coalitions that includes 14 Pacific Island states (Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu) in 
the climate change regime (Fry & Tarte, 2015;4-5). Among 21 coalition blocs that 
have actively participated in the climate change regime, 6 blocs associated with one or 
more Pacific countries (Carter, 2015;209). 
One of the coalitions is Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Founded in 
1990, the AOSIS has and continues to be an important bloc in the formal negotiations 
with resonance to the needs of Pacific Island states. It has a membership of 44 small 
island states and low-lying coastal states that are very vulnerable to climate change. 
All 14 Pacific Island countries are part of the AOSIS (Carter, 2015;211). The main 
function of AOSIS is as an ad hoc for lobbying and negotiating the voice of Small 
Island Development States (SIDS) within the UN system (http://aosis.org/about/).The 
coalition is important in shaping the climate change regime when it prepared the 
original draft of the Kyoto Protocol, supporting for 20 per cent cuts in carbon dioxide 
emissions from 1990 levels by 2005. The ad hoc lobby group provides a voice to the 
SIDS on environmental and climate change matters. The AOSIS has long been the 
core focal point for many Pacific negotiators on capacity support and technical 
matters. The bloc has been successful in lobbying for SIDS as special case In the Rio 
summit of 1992 that led to the creation of the SIDS conferences (Carter, 2015;211). 
Various coalition blocs in climate change negotiations provide two main 
benefits for Pacific Island countries. First, according to George Carter, by joining 
coalitions, Pacific Island countries have access to a wide network of negotiators. 
Coalitions are able to bring various actors (including non-state actors) from country 
representatives such as ambassadors, ministries of foreign affairs, academics, and 
scientists. As a result, delegates from Pacific Island countries are able to talk about 
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climate change issues fluently in various negotiations. The coalition blocs such as the 
G77 (Schiavone, 2008;162) and AOSIS have facilitated various functions such as 
research, assembled advisory capacity, and technical regulatory frameworks for its 
members (Carter, 2015;214). Second, coalitions present opportunities for Pacific 
leaders to lead in climate leadership. The increased participation of Pacific leaders as 
chairs of various blocssuch as Robert van Lierop from Vanuatu and Marlene Moses 
from Nauru as the chairs of AOSIS, Papua New Guinea’s Michael Somare and Fiji’s 
Ratu Inoke Kubuabola for the G77 Plus China has instilled more attention to the 
vulnerability of the Pacific Island countries in climate change issues.At the UN Third 
SIDS 2014 meeting, Pacific leaders made sure that they negotiated to have the climate 
change issue contained in outcome document and pushed 4,500 participating delegates 
from states and non-state actors to contribute to a legally binding agreement in Paris 
(Carter, 2015;214). In this sense, coalition-building through IGOs provides benefits 
for small states.  
 
2. IGOs, Issue Prioritisation, and Agenda Setting 
Issue prioritisation can help small states to increase their power in the UN. Starting 
with a relatively small number of members, the UN nearly tripled in size, from 51 to 
193 member-states, between 1945 and 2018. It goes without saying that the UN has 
become one of the principal venues through which most states pursue their national 
interests.  By focusing on issue prioritisation and agenda setting in the UN, small 
states can leverage their influence (no matter how small they are). Like what Panke 
(2015) says, the precondition for small states for success in international level is issue 
prioritisation. Due to the limited budgets, small states cannot follow every issue 
simultaneously with equal attention. Instead, they can prioritise and invest their 
resources in issues of particular importance. For example, as small states, Pacific 
Island states tend to focus on climate change in the UN level. Pacific leaders made 
major efforts to establish and advocated climate change as a global issue. Another 
small state, Seychelles, successfully gains international reputations because of its role 
in maritime security and ocean diplomacy (Buerger & Wivel, 2018;177-181). It even 
recognised as an innovator in ocean governance, through initiatives such as marine 
spatial planning initiative (Buerger & Wivel, 2018;177-181). Small states can focus on 
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the main problems that they experience and find creative ways through diplomacy to 
establish their issues as global issues. So that, it can attract other states and indirectly 
fulfil small states’ interests.  In my opinion, it is crucial for states to know what their 
problems are so they know what to prioritize. This issue prioritization can lead to 
agenda setting as another strategy. 
Agenda setting as small states’ strategy to increase their power in world 
politics. Steven G. Livingston (1992; 313) defines agenda setting as “the process of 
raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors.” Agenda-setting is 
the process of small states raising and communicating their priority issues at the global 
level. The reality is small states cannot claim to be global powers, even if they share in 
global governance at the UN. However, there are other international roles (such as 
agenda setting) where smallness is no disqualification (Thorhallsson & Bailes, 
2016;298). Many small states can choose the highest priority issues on which to focus 
their limited resources. In the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Article 10 
of the UN Charter gives opportunities for member states (including small states) to 
address any matter within the scope of the Charter. This opens opportunities for small 
states to bring their priority issues and try to leverage their influence. To illustrate, 
Malta was the first nation to propose the principle of deep seabed, as well as high seas, 
were part of the “common heritage of mankind,” which contributed to renegotiation of 
the law of the sea. Other small states such as Uganda has established HIV/AIDS as its 
niche issue and Seychelles which widely recognised as a major facilitator, policy 
entrepreneur, and advocate concerning the sustainable development of the oceans 
(Bueger & Wivel,2018;170). 
The Seychelles uses issue prioritisation and agenda setting to leverage its 
influence in ocean diplomacy. According to Christian Bueger and Anders Wivel 
(2018), the Seychelles is “an archipelagic state in the middle of the Western Indian 
Ocean with a population of less than 100,000.” It is highly dependent on the ocean and 
maritime resources for economic development. The Seychelles is recognised as a 
microstate due to its small size, landmass, Gross Domestic Product, and the small size 
of its diplomatic service. Consequently, the Seychelles as a microstate may be viewed 
as an acute form of the small state, which is always the weak state in asymmetric 
relationships when interacting with other states in the international level. However, 
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Seychelles is one of the exceptions. Despite its smallness, it is a broker in international 
organisations and an agenda setter in ocean governance. 
The success factors of Seychelles in the global level are issue prioritisation and 
agenda setting. First, the Seychelles fully recognises its position as a small island state. 
By recognising this, the state started to play its role as a leading advocate of the 
concept of blue economy, an emerging concept which realises and encourages better 
management of our ocean or ‘blue' resources (as a result of issue prioritisation) 
(http://thecommonwealth.org/blue-economy). Second, concerning agenda setting, the 
Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) started to work on a blue economy 
campaign and making the issue as the core concept of its foreign policy. Blue ocean 
had started to be part of the main concept relating to the developmental and 
environmental challenges associated with the oceans during the Rio+20 conference 
(https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/2978BEconcept.pdf). The 
government of Seychelles made great efforts to clarify the concept of blue economy 
and advocated for its utilisation globally. The government gave a series of 
presentations about blue economy in various events. The MFA also drafted a larger 
study on the blue economy and published it as a book. As the Seychelles President 
stated that the country utilised the blue economy concept as a tool to access the world 
political stages, highlighting that the state is being invited to share their thoughts at 
various international conferences as well as political meetings. As an outcome of issue 
prioritisation and agenda setting, the blue ocean was included as the main concept in 
the African Union's African Integrated Maritime strategy. In 2015, various 
international reports affirmed the importance of the blue economy concept and also 
established this microstate as a leading advocate and innovator in the implementation 
of blue economy. Seychelles' advocacy work was also crucial in organising the 
coalition to include an ocean goal in the SDGs, even though the campaign was mainly 
lead by the Pacific. Moreover, the limitations of small state diplomacy also need to be 
considered. 
 
The Limitations of Small State Diplomacy 
Like two sides of a coin, small state diplomacy also has limitations. First, small states 
may be aware that there are many interests in coalition building such as 14 Pacific 
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Island countries among 44 members of the AOSIS. In this sense, each small state has 
to make sure that its national interests can be included in the collective interests of the 
coalitions. In fact, a greater number of coalitions players lead to multiple interests, 
rules, and issues that are constantly changing. These all complicate the processes of 
establishing common ground for reaching agreements (Karns & Mingst, 2013;144). 
Consequently, it is important to make sure that the position of each small state does 
not be ignored or sidelined. This depends on the ability of small states’ representatives 
in establishing and communicating their national interests through negotiation 
strategies. The second limitation is the dependence on expertise. To illustrate, even 
though Seychelles has become world-leading expertise in blue economy, this specialist 
knowledge is in the hands of few people only. In other fields, this country has to rely 
on external experts and consultants (Bueger & Wivel,2018;183). It is similar with 
Pacific states that also depend on research facilitation provided by G77 and AOSIS. 
Lastly, the success of small states diplomacy also depends on the willingness 
of other great powers such as China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States as the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Article 
27(3) of the UN Charter demands the concurring votes by permanent members 
(Thakur, 2006;33). Consequently, each permanent member can veto resolutions that 
contain issues that are detrimental to their interests. Thus, it is important for small 
states to consider how their proposals can bring benefit or at least do not threaten the 
interests of great powers. The success of the blue economy agenda of Seychelles was a 
result of the state taking advantage of existing agenda and actively seeking for 
problems recognised by major powers (Bueger & Wivel,2018;183). However, these 
limitations should not be viewed as stumbling blocks for small states to keep moving 
forward. 
 
Conclusion 
This essay illustrates that financial means is the main obstacle for small states in 
conducting international negotiations. However, small states can take advantages of 
the rise of non-traditional issues and inherent resilience as the power sources in global 
development diplomacy. To increase their power in global negotiations through 
various IGOs (especially the UN), small states can use three main strategies of 
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coalition building, issue prioritisation, and agenda setting. The UN and other major 
IGOs provide forums in which small states can engage with relatively low cost with 
delegations from many states. Small states can establish coalitions concerning certain 
issues that can be beneficial to them such as AOSIS in the climate change 
negotiations. Meanwhile, concerning limited budgets and small size of representatives, 
small states can focus on issue prioritisation and agenda setting to leverage their 
influence. Article 10 of the UN Charter provides opportunities for the small states to 
address any issue within the scope of the UN that important to them. The essay has 
provided the Seychelles as an example of a small state that has successfully utilised 
issue prioritisation and agenda setting to leverage its influence in ocean diplomacy. 
Finally, as there is no perfect human being, small state diplomacy also has limitations. 
However, these limitations should not be seen as an obstacle, but an opportunity for 
small states to find creative ways in turning weaknesses into power. 
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